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Supervision of Charitable Trusts
in California
By LISA M. BELL*
and
ROBERT B. BEL**

A trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property. A
charitable trust is created by the expression of a charitable intent
in a will, trust instrument, or corporate charter and requires the
trustee to use the property for a charitable purpose such as religion, education, or public welfare. The Uniform Supervision of
Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act (Uniform Act) was passed to
supply the attorney general with the information needed to fulfill
adequately his or her common law duty to protect the public interest in charitable trusts.
This Article examines the operation of the Uniform Act in
California. First, it discusses the history of the Uniform Act and its
passage in California. The Article then analyzes the provisions of
the Act and judicial decisions interpreting the Act. Next, it describes the daily functioning of the Registry of Charitable Trusts
and analyzes the litigation brought under the Act by the Attorney
General's Office. The Article concludes by making some observations about the role of the Uniform Act and offers some suggestions for improving its practical application.

Historical Background
The power of the attorney general to represent the public interest in the administration of charitable trusts originated in the
B.A., 1977, Wellesley College; J.D., 1980, Stanford University.
B.A., 1975, Dartmouth College; M.A., 1977, Cambridge University;, J.D., 1980, Stanford University.
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early common law.1 Largely because of the nature of charitable
trusts it was thought that private individuals could not as effectively prevent the misuse of the trust property. The beneficiaries of
charitable trusts are always indefinite,2 usually very numerous, and

often recipients of small individual benefits. As a result, it is unlikely that one individual will choose to bear the litigation expense
of enforcing a trust in order to receive his or her small benefit.$ In
addition, an individual beneficiary rarely knows of the existence of
a trust or that he or she is an intended beneficiary, thus further
impeding private enforcement. Even if the charitable beneficiary is
aware of these facts, he or she has no access to information concerning the management of the trust. Because the beneficiary of
most charitable trusts is the community at large and because private enforcement proved ineffective, the common law gave the attorney general the power to oversee charitable trusts.
The attorney general's power at common law to supervise
charitable trusts was exclusive because of the fear that a large and
shifting class of beneficiaries could subject trusts to harassment by
bringing frivolous suits. 4 As a result, a general beneficiary-a per-

son with no special interest in the performance of a charitable
trust-could not bring suit for enforcement of the trust." Moreover, a general beneficiary could not compel the attorney general
to bring an enforcement action against a charitable trust.6 The
only person other than the attorney general who could bring suit to
enforce a charitable trust was a trustee or a person having a defi1. See Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750, 754, 394
P.2d 932, 935, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 247 (1964). Suits were brought by the attorney general in

England to enforce charitable trusts even before enactment of the Statute of Charitable
Uses in 1606. 4 A. ScOT, THE LAW OF TRuSTs § 391, at 3002 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited
as Scow]; Bogert, Proposed Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities, 52
MICH. L. Rzv. 633, 636 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Legislation].
2. Charitable beneficiaries are indefinite because they are theoretically merely conduits through whom social benefits flow to the public. ProposedLegislation, supra, note 1,
at 633.
3. This theory ignores the possibility of class actions. However, class actions as well as
individual suits are limited by the rule that general beneficiaries cannot sue to enforce a
charitable trust. See note 5 & accompanying text infra.
4. G. G. BOGERT & G. T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRusTs AND TRusTEEs § 411, at 414 (2d
rev. ed. 1977).
5. 4 ScoTT, supra note 1, § 391, at 3010. See George Pepperdine Foundation v.
Pepperdine, 126 Cal. App. 2d 154, 161, 271 P.2d 600, 6P5 (1954).
6. Ames v. Attorney General, 332 Mass. 246, 124 N.E.2d 511 (1955) (decision of the
attorney general not to permit use of his name in a suit against a trustee for alleged breach

of a charitable trust an executive decision not reviewable by a court).
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nite interest in the trust property. 7 For example, where a trust was
created to endow a professorial chair, the general beneficiary of the
trust was the community, but the professor-beneficiary had a special interest in the trust's performance which he or she could enforce in court.8 When a person having such a special interest
brought suit for enforcement of the trust, the attorney general was
ordinarily a necessary party to the suit as his or her presence protected the public interest. 9
The underlying assumption of this American common law theory was that interested parties would notify the attorney general
whenever intervention was necessary. This assumption proved unrealistic, however, for many of the same reasons that private enforcement was ineffective. 10 The experience in common law jurisdictions was that such intervention occurred quite infrequently.1
There also were no common law requirements that charitable
trusts register or file periodic reports; consequently, the attorney
general remained ignorant as to the number of charitable trusts
operating in a state, their assets, and whether these assets were
properly administered. As a result, by the 1950's, an accepted view
among commentators was that "there are in all jurisdictions a relatively large number of charities which are inactive or neglected and
a few in which the trustees have by positive action, innocently or
in bad faith, committed breaches of trust.' 2 To remedy these apparent problems, numerous scholars urged greater public accountability and periodic disclosure by charitable trusts. 8
Prior to 1954, four states-New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Ohio, and Massachusetts-had enacted statutes establishing in the
attorney general's office a special division to receive annual reports
from charitable trusts and to supervise their activities." Direct re7. See Scorr, supra note 1, § 391, at 3002-10.
S. Id. § 391, at 3007-09.
9. Estate of Schloss, 56 Cal. 2d 248, 257, 363 P.2d 875, 880, 14 Cal. Rptr. 643, 648
(1961).
10. See notes 2-3 & accompanying text supra.
11. Brown & Coblentz, Charitable Trusts in California, 30 CAL. ST. B.J. 425, 426
(1955).
12. Proposed Legislation, supra note 1, at 635.
13. See, e.g., E. TAYLOR, PunLic AccoUNTABmrry OF FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE
TRUSTS (1953); Proposed Legislation, supra note 1; Bogert, Recent Developments Regarding the Law of CharitableDonations and Charitable Trusts, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 95 (1954);
Forer, Forgotten Funds: Suggesting Disclosure Laws for CharitableFunds, 105 U. PA. L.
Pav. 1044 (1957); Note, Supervision of CharitableFunds, 21 U. Cm.L. REv. 118 (1953).
14. Act of June 1, 1954, § 1, 1954 Mass. Acts 450 (current revision at MAss. ANN. LAws

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 32

porting proved beneficial in New Hampshire and Rhode Island.
During the first two years after the Rhode Island statute was enacted, the attorney general closed thirty-five court cases and had
twelve matters pending although fewer than five hundred trusts
were registered.1 Prior to registration no actions had been initiated by the state attorney general. 16 The New Hampshire Attorney
General gave this report on the statute's effect in New Hampshire:
Trust funds which lay dormant for one reason or another came to
life again for the benefit of charities .... The bad practice of
accumulating a large portion of the income each year was
stopped.... Petitions for cy pres application of funds left for
objects no longer practicable were also more frequent. In one case
a fund of nearly a million dollars, with only two years to go before
a testamentary limitation of twenty years would have become effective, with resulting reversion to the estate, was awakened and
immediate steps were taken to prevent forfeiture and to insure
application for the benefit of the inhabitants of New Hampshire
in the field of education. 17
Reporting statutes also enabled the value of charitable trusts to be
estimated accurately for the first time.18 Unfortunately, less information is available about the effect of the statutes in Massachusetts and Ohio.
Largely as a result of the experience in New Hampshire, the
National Association of Attorneys General in 1951 requested the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to
draft an act requiring trustees to report to the state attorney general on the existence and administration of property held in charitable trusts. After preliminary presentations in 1952 and 1953, the
1954 session approved the Uniform Supervision of Trustees for
Charitable Purposes Act, which was subsequently approved by the
ch. 12, § 8B (Michie/Law. Co-op 1980)); Act of July 1, 1943, ch. 181, para. 1, 1943 N.H. Laws
259 (current version at N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 7: 19 (Supp. 1979)); Act of July 15, 1953, § 1,
1953 Ohio Laws 351 (current version at OmIo REv. CoDE ANN. § 109.33 (Page 1978)); Act of
Apr. 24, 1950, ch. 2617, § 1, 1950 R.I. Pub. Laws 739 (current version at R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 18-9-1 (1956)).
15. Note, Supervision of CharitableTrusts, 21 U. CHi. L. REv. 118, 124 (1953) (citing
Report of the Administrator of Charitable Trusts (Jan., 1951-Dec., 1952)).
16. Id.
17. New Hampshire Attorney General's Report (1944-46), quoted in Note, Supervision of CharitableTrusts, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 118, 128-29 (1953).
18. After Rhode Island adopted a statute providing for the registration of charitable
trusts in 1950, 496 trusts were recorded with assets of $62,000,000. Proposed Legislation,
supra note 1, at 644.
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American Bar Association." At the urging of then Attorney General Edmund Brown, California in 1955 became the first state to
20
adopt the Uniform Act.
Although the California Legislature adopted the Uniform Act,
political opposition severely limited its practical significance. Initially, no funds were budgeted for administration and the Uniform
Act's life was limited by amendment to two years.2 1 In 1957 the
statute's life was extended two more years, but it still received no
funding for its administration. 2 The lack of funding during the
first four years under the Uniform Act severely curtailed its effectiveness. The attorney general could not hire any staff to review
the registration forms and financial reports which were filed. In
addition, the statute's short life and the absence of enforcement
staff persuaded many trustees not to comply with its terms. Most
importantly, the Uniform Act did not apply to charitable corporations. While the number of charitable corporations in California in
the 1950's is unknown, 80% of the 29,000 charitable organizations
registered in California in 1980 are incorporated, 14% are trusts,
and 6% are unincorporated associations. 23 Thus, the original version of the California law presumably applied to only a small percentage of charities.
In 1959 the Uniform Act became a permanent statute in Cali19. Prefatory Note to UNIFORM SUPERVISION OF TRUSTEES FOR CHAMrrABLE PURPOSES
AcT, in 7A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 745 (master ed. 1978); see generally ProposedLegis-

lation, supra note 1, at 649-52.
20. Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act, Cal. Stats. 1955, ch.
1820, § 1, at 3357-58 (current version at CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12580-12595 (West 1963 &
Supp. 1980)). Wallace Howland, a former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Trusts and Trade Practices Unit, pinpoints the rather unusual beginning of Brown's concern over charitable trusts. Sometime during the early 1950's Brown saw an article in a
Portland newspaper about a charitable trust which operated the jockey club at a San Francisco race track. Apparently funds from this trust had been invested in a highly speculative
horse-racing venture on the banks of the Columbia River. When the river flooded, destroying the track, thousands of dollars belonging to California beneficiaries were lost. Brown
ordered an investigation, recovered the remaining assets, and reorganized the trust. The
incident prompted him to draft legislation increasing the power of the attorney general to
compel disclosure of funds dedicated to charitable purposes. Eventually the Uniform Act
became part of the attorney general's legislative program for 1955. Howland, The History of
the Supervision of CharitableTrusts and Corporationsin California,13 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
1029, 1030 (1966).
21. Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act, Cal. Stats. 1955, ch.
1820, § 1, at 3357-58 (repealing Cal. Stats. 1959, ch. 1258, § 1, at 3396).
22. Act of July 8, 1967, Cal. Stats. 1957, ch. 2024, § 1, at 3595.
23. Interview with Larry Campbell, Registrar of Charitable Trusts (March 14, 1980).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vl. 32

fornia"4 and funds were appropriated for its administration. Several other changes were also made at that time to strengthen the
statute. First, its application was extended to all nonprofit corporations organized for charitable purposes, 25 with certain exceptions.2
Second, a new provision required that instruments establishing
trusts for charitable purposes be filed with the attorney general by
the person offering the instrument for probate.17 Third, the attorney general's participation was required in any suit to modify or to
terminate a charitable trust.28 A final innovation consisted" of the
establishment of the Registry of Charitable Trusts to receive and
analyze all reports filed under the Act. 9
Following California's lead, three states-Illinois, Michigan,
and Oregon-adopted the Uniform Act.80 At least nineteen other
states have enacted similar statutes." No explanation has been offered as to why only four states have adopted the Uniform Act,
and fewer than half the states have any reporting requirements at
all. Perhaps some states have not adopted the Uniform Act because it does not apply to corporations, although the statute can
easily be amended as it was in California. A more plausible explanation might be that supervision of charities is an issue with little
political urgency. When it has become an issue as the result of a
well'publicized incident, opponents of strict supervision have been
able to force compromises which have led to the enactment of less
24. Act of July 30, 1959, Cal. Stats. 1969, ch. 1258, § 2, at 3396 (current version at CAL.
Gov'T CODE §§ 12580-12595 (West 1963 & Supp. 1980)). For a summary of the 1959 changes,
see 34 CAL. ST. B.J. 697, 697-98 (1959).
25. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12581-12582.1 (West 1963). Consequently, the term "charita-

ble trust" as used in the remainder of this Article includes both trusts and corporations.
26.
27.
28.

Id. § 12583.
Id. § 12593.
Id. § 12591.

29. Id. § 12584. In addition to assisting the attorney general in carrying out his or her
duties, the Registry also provides information to members of the public seeking charitable
funds and assists charities with financial and administrative problems.
30. Charitable Trust Act, § 1, 2-1961 I. Laws 2094 (current version at IL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 14, §§ 51-64 (Smith-Hurd 1963)); Act of May 26, 1961, No. 101, 1961 Mich. Pub. Acts
108 (current version at MiCH. Com'. LAws ANN. §§ 14.251-.266 (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§
26.1200(1)-.1200(12) (1970 & Supp. 1980))); Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable
Purposes Act, ch. 583, 1963 Or. Laws 1186 (current version at OR. REv. STATS. §§ 128.610.750 (1979)).
31. Compiled from information contained in G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRusTEs § 411, at 422-23 n.32 (2d rev. ed. 1977) and Berry & Buchwald,
Enforcement of College Trustees' FiduciaryDuties: Students and the Problem of Standing, 9 U.S.F. L, Rv. 1, 41 (1974).

November 1980]

CHARITABLE TRUSTS

comprehensive statutes."2

Provisions of the Uniform Act
The Uniform Act, as adopted in California; requires charitable
corporations and trustees holding property for charitable purposes3s to register with the Attorney General's Office" and to file
periodic reports describing the assets held in trust and their administration. 8 A trustee for purposes of the Uniform Act includes
individuals, corporations, and other legal entities holding property
pursuant to a charitable trust.38 The definition also includes corporations which accept property for a specific charitable purpose,
though not necessarily pursuant to a trust,3 7 and corporations
formed to administer an existing trust.3 8 When the Uniform Act
was adopted in 1955, it did not specifically include nonprofit corporations that accept property for general charitable purposes.
This omission shielded charitable corporations from the statute's
disclosure requirements. In 1959 the statute was amended to include charitable corporations within its scope.3 9 Any governmental
agency, religious corporation, cemetery corporation, or charitable
corporation "organized and operated primarily as a religious organization, educational institution, or hospital," however, remains
exempt.' 0
The Uniform Act requires a new charitable organization to
register 4 1 within six months after any part of the income or principal of the trust property is authorized to be applied to a charitable
purpose. 42 The attorney general, pursuant to the general rulemak32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See note 20 supra.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12581 (West Supp. 1980).
Id. § 12585 (West 1963).
Id. § 12586 (West Supp. 1980).
Id. § 12582(a) (West 1963).
Id. § 12582(b).
Id. § 12582(c).

39. Id. § 12582.1. See Howland, The History of the Supervision of CharitableTrusts
and Corporationsin California,13 U.C.L.A. L. Ray. 1029, 1031 (1966). The attorney general
originally had the statutory power to supervise charitable corporations pursuant to CAL.
CORP. CODE § 9505 (repealed Cal. Stats. 1978, ch. 567, § 9, at 1924), but not to require the
disclosure of information as under the Uniform Act.
40.

CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12583 (West Supp. 1980).

41. The registration is filed with the Registrar of Charitable Trusts in the Office of the
Attorney General in Sacramento. CAL. ArmLN. CODE tit. 11, §§ 300, 302 (1978).
42. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12585 (West 1963).
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ing power authorized under the statute, 4 has defined a proper registration to include a copy of the articles of incorporation and the
bylaws in the case of charitable corporations, or the trust agreement, decree of distribution, or other instrument providing for the
44
trustee's title, powers, and duties in the case of a trust.

After the initial registration, trustees and charitable corporations (except corporate trustees regulated by bank authorities)
must file annual reports concerning the administration of the
assets held in trust.45 The attorney general may extend the filing
date for good cause and may suspend the filing of annual reports if
the interests of the beneficiaries would not be prejudiced.' 0 The
attorney general may also make any rules and regulations concerning the content and the timing of periodic reports provided that
the reports do not unreasonably add to the expense of the administration of the charitable organization.' 7
Under the Uniform Act the attorney general may investigate
charitable organizations to verify the accuracy of annual reports4849
and to ascertain whether the trust purposes are being carried out.

In conducting an investigation, the attorney general has full discovery powers50 and may obtain information from public records,
court officers, taxing authorities, trustees, and other sources to discover charitable organizations that have failed to register. 1 For
example, tax officials must fie annually with the attorney general a
list of all charitable organizations that apply for tax exemptions."2
Also, any person who offers for probate a will establishing a charitable trust or who records an inter vivos gift to charity must notify
the attorney general. 53 Finally, the custodian of records for any
probate court must file copies of any records relating to charitable
43.

Id. § 12587.

44. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 300 (1978).
45. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12586(a) (West Supp. 1980). See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11,
§ 305 (1978).
46. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12586(b) (West Supp. 1980). See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11,

§ 305 (1978).
47. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12586(b) (West Supp. 1980). See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11,
§ 305 (1978).
48. See CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12588 (West 1963).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 12584.
52. Id. A charitable corporation that fails to file its registration or annual reports will
lose its tax exemption under CAL. RzV. & TAX. CODE § 23703 (West 1979).
53.

CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12593 (West 1963).
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organizations. 5 4
The attorney general can force charitable organizations to
comply with the terms of the statute by instituting judicial proceedings.5" If the organization involved in such a proceeding is
found guilty of noncompliance, the parties responsible within the
organization not only must comply, but must also pay the expenses
incurred by the attorney general in investigating and prosecuting
the case. 6 In addition to having the power to institute actions to
compel compliance, the attorney general must be a party to any
court action brought by a private party to modify or to terminate
any trust for charitable purposes. 57 Finally, the Uniform Act permits private citizens to inspect the register and any reports filed
with the attorney general that deal exclusively with charitable
organizations."8
Judicial Interpretation of the Uniform Act
The Uniform Act is primarily a reporting statute. Based on
information obtained under the Act's notification and reporting
provisions, the attorney general has instituted numerous suits to
enforce the terms of trusts, to represent the public interest in will
contests and cy pres proceedings, and to recover trust funds diverted for personal use. There has been, however, very little litigation interpreting the Uniform Act itself.
The recent Illinois case of Scott v. George F. Harding Museum59 is one of the few instances in which the interpretation of
the Uniform Act has been raised in litigation. The museum's purpose, as provided in its articles of incorporation, was to "found,
build, maintain and operate a museum for the exhibition of the
collection." 6 0 In 1965, however, after thirty-five years of public exhibition, the museum relocated and ceased to be open to the public. The attorney general subsequently brought an action against
the trustees of the museum, pursuant to the Uniform Act and to
54.
55.
ten year
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. § 12591. The only limitation on the attorney general's prosecutorial powers is a
statute of limitations. Id. § 12596 (West Supp. 1980).
Id. § 12597.
Id. § 12591 (West 1963).
Id. § 12590. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 310 (1978).
58 Ill.
App. 3d 408, 374 N.E.2d 756 (1978).
Id. at 410, 374 N.E.2d at 758.
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his common law powers, seeking an accounting, removal of the
trustees, and an order temporarily restraining the trustees from
disposing of the museum's assets, as well as enforcement of the
terms of the trust.
The defendants first claimed that the Uniform Act was inapplicable because the property was held for educational, not charitable, purposes."1 The court rejected this contention, citing the
well-established rule that trusts for educational purposes are charitable. 62 The defendants next argued that the Uniform Act unconstitutionally violates the guarantee of equal protection because it
exempts those charitable trusts that operate schools, but not those
that operate museums, without a rational basis for the distinction.
The argument apparently rested on the assumption that, as educational institutions, museums and private schools should be afforded equal treatment under the Uniform Act. In rejecting this
argument, the court adopted the attorney general's reasoning:
[T]he classification is directly related to the State's interest in
ensuring the enforcement of charitable trusts. This distinction
recognizes that where a charitable trust benefits an identifiable
segment of society, it is reasonable to believe that if the trust
funds are not properly applied, the class of beneficiaries will act
to inform the Attorney General. Schools benefit identifiable segment of society ....

[T]he Harding Museum does not bear this

self-executing feature. 8
The court unnecessarily determined the existence of a rational
basis for differential treatment of charitable trusts under the Uniform Act. The Uniform Act exempts schools and certain other institutions only from reporting requirements. 6 ' The issue in Scott
was whether the attorney general had the power to enforce the
terms of the museum's charter. At common law the attorney general had the power to institute proceedings to enforce the terms of
any charitable trust regardless of whether the trust operated a
school, a museum, or a church. 65 Because the Uniform Act does not
61. The Illinois statute defines a "trustee" as "any individual, group of individuals,
corporation, or other legal entity holding property for any charitable purpose." ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 14, § 53 (Smith-Hurd 1963).
62. 58 Ill. App. 3d at 414, 374 N.E.2d at 760.
63. Id. at 416-17, 374 N.E.2d at 762.
64. See note 40 & accompanying text supra.
65. See, e.g., Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750, 395
P.2d 932, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1964); Commonwealth v. Barnes Foundation, 398 Pa. 458, 159
A.2d 500 (1960) (action by attorney general against museum trustees). See generally 4
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alter this power or give the attorney general any additional powers
with respect to enforcing charitable trusts,"' the attorney general
in Scott had the authority to bring the enforcement action.
No legislative history exists which sheds light on why charitable corporations operated primarily as hospitals, educational institutions, or religious organizations were exempted from reporting
requirements.6 7 It is not difficult, however, to imagine why religious
organizations are exempt. Although the neutral application of civil
laws to the secular business functions of churches does not violate
the first amendment,6 8 the authors of the Uniform Act probably
sought to avoid opposition by powerful religious groups. In addition, religious groups were probably not perceived to be organizations requiring close supervision in the 1950's. Exemptions for private schools and hospitals might be explained by the fact that they
are regulated by other state and federal agencies.6 9 However, such
regulation serves a different purpose than the reporting requirements of the Uniform Act, the goal of which is to provide information to enable the attorney general to prevent self-dealing and misuse of assets and to ensure that organizations conform to the
purposes for which they were established. Perhaps the best explanation for these exemptions is provided in a letter from Ernest
D'Amours, then Director of Charitable Trusts of New Hampshire:
"With respect to exemptions for charitable corporations holding
funds for religious and educational purposes, I think they are bad
theoretically but consider them expedient for successful passage of
this legislation since the politicians are fearful of these two
lobbies."70
Scorr supra note 1, § 370.1, at 2873; id. § 370.5, at 2876; id. § 371, at 2879; id. § 391, at

3002.
66. "Nothing in this Act confers on the Attorney General any additional power to administer, supervise, or direct the administration of charitable trusts." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 14,
§ 63 (Smith-Hurd 1963). In contrast, the California provision reads: "The powers and duties of the Attorney General provided in this Act are in addition to his existing powers and
duties." CAL. GOV'T CoDE § 12591 (West 1963).
67. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12583 (West Supp. 1980).
68. See, e.g., Lynch v. Spilman, 67 Cal. 2d 251, 431 P.2d 636, 62 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1967).
69. Professors Berry and Buchwald argue that the lack of disclosure by educational
trusts to the attorney general and the resulting lack of control over educational trusts is a
reason to modify standing rules and allow general beneficiaries of such trusts to sue to en-

force them. Berry & Buchwald, Enforcement of College Trustees' Fiduciary Duties: Students and the Problem of Standing, 9 U.S.F. L. REv. 1 (1974).
70. Letter from Ernest D'Amours to George Bogert (May 7, 1954), quoted in Forer,

ForgottenFunds: Suggesting DisclosureLaws for Charitable Funds, 105 U. PA. L. Rv.
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The only reported cases in California in which the Uniform
Act has been involved in litigation concern the issue of standing to
sue.7 1 Prior to the Uniform Act, the rule in California was stated in
George PepperdineFoundation v. Pepperdine.72 In Pepperdine a
charitable corporation brought suit against its former directors for
damages resulting from "dissipation of its assets through illegal
and speculative transactions and mismanagement of its affairs"
during their incumbencies. 8 In affirming dismissal of the suit, the
appellate court found that the "Pepperdine Foundation is a purely
benevolent, public, charitable trust whose beneficiaries are of an
indefinite class of persons. Consequently, the only person qualified
to maintain an action on behalf of the foundation is the attorney
general."7 4
Adoption of the Uniform Act in 1955 did not purport to affect
standing to sue. As a result, the restrictive view of standing set
forth in Pepperdinewas followed in California until 1964, when it
was overruled by Holt v. College of OsteopathicPhysicians & Surgeons.75 In Holt three trustees brought suit against the twentythree majority trustees of the College of Osteopathic Physicians
and Surgeons to enjoin them from diverting assets to purposes
other than those for which the college was organized. The college's
articles of incorporation stated that its purpose was "[t]o establish,
maintain, carry on and conduct an osteopathic medical and surgical college."7 " The majority trustees, however, had taken actions
1044, 1056 (1957). The letter refers to the exemptions in the Uniform Act which were approved by the Commissioners on the Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association
later in 1954.
71. See generally Comment, Selected Problems of California CharitableCorporation
Administration: Standing to Sue, and Directors' Ability to Change Purpose, 13 U.C.L.A.
L. Rav. 1123 (1966).
72. 126 Cal. App. 2d 154, 271 P.2d 600 (1954).
73. Id. at 155, 271 P.2d at 601. Although the court did not reach the merits of the case,
it is believed that because Pepperdine, who dominated and controlled the foundation, had
endowed it with over $3,000,000, he "could not have purposed to sabotage his own enterprise, so stupendous and magnificent as to extend its influence into the far reaches of many
necessitous fields of human endeavor." Id. at 159-60, 271 P.2d at 604. The court held that
because an individual could not be sued for negligently investing his or her own money
intended for charitable uses, a foundation should not be able to recover from the original
donor the losses his or her negligence caused the foundation. Id. at 160, 271 P.2d at 605.
The opinion did not discuss whether holding donors to a lesser standard of care than that of
other trustees would invite them to use tax-exempt charitable funds for their own purposes.
74. Id. at 161, 271 P.2d at 605 (emphasis added).
75. 61 Cal. 2d 750, 394 P.2d 932, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1964).
76. Id. at 757, 394 P.2d 937, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
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which effectively converted the college into a school teaching nonosteopathic medicine and surgery. The attorney general refused
the minority trustees' request to bring an action on their behalf on
the grounds that "the changes to be made in the operation of said
College would not be detrimental to the public interest and do not
warrant legal action by this office to prevent such changes. 7 7 In
response to the suit by the minority trustees, the majority directors contended that only the attorney general had standing to object to an alleged breach of a charitable trust.
On review, the California Supreme Court overruled Pepperdine and allowed the suit, holding that nothing in the Uniform Act
precludes trustees from bringing an action to enforce a trust. Justice Traynor observed that the case illustrated some of the difficulties in relying solely on the attorney general to bring suit.7 8 One
such problem is that the interests of the minority trustee may differ from those of the public, whose interest the attorney general is
charged with protecting. The court admonished the attorney general for applying the wrong standard: "The test applied by the
attorney general in deciding not to take legal action is clearly incorrect, for the assets of [the college] as a charitable institution can
be used only for the purposes for which they were received in trust.
The trust is not fulfilled merely by applying the assets in the public interest."79
Justice Traynor further reasoned that the policy of protecting
charities from harassing litigation by limiting standing to the attorney general does not apply to "enforcement by fiduciaries who
are both few in number and charged with the duty of managing the
charity's affairs." 80 Rather, allowing suits by trustees should aid in
the enforcement of charitable trusts because trustees are in the
best position to discover breaches and bring the relevant facts to
the court's attention. 81 Furthermore, allowing suits by trustees
does not alter the attorney general's duty to represent the public
interest because he or she remains a necessary party to any
litigation.
77.
to grant
78.
79.

Id. at 752, 394 P.2d at 934, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 246. The attorney general also refused
relator status to the plaintiff. Id.
Id. at 754, 394 P.2d at 935, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
Id. at 755, 394 P.2d at 936, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 248.

80. Id. (quoting Karst, The Efficiency of the CharitableDollar: An Unfulfilled State
Responsibility, 73 HRv.L. Rlv.433, 444-45 (1960)).
81. 61 Cal. 2d at 755-56, 394 P.2d at 936, 40 Cal. Rptr. 248.
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The defendants in Holt also contended that a different standing rule should apply to directors of a charitable corporation than
that which applies to trustees of a legally-organized trust. Noting
that "rules governing charitable trusts ordinarily apply to charitable corporations, ' 82 the court held that minority directors or trustees of88 a charitable corporation have standing to sue for breach of
trust.
Although Holt gave standing to trustees only, its rationale was
used to provide standing for nontrustees in San Diego County
Council, Boy Scouts of America v. City of Escondido." In San Diego County Council a parcel of real property was held in trust for
the benefit of the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts of Escondido. The
property was eventually purchased by the City of Escondido for a
nominal consideration. The city then announced that it planned to
sell the property and use the proceeds for youth parks and recreational capital developments. The city's intent to use the trust
property for a wider and broader public use than the trust instrument dictated was similar to the intention announced by the trustees in Holt. The plaintiff Boy Scout Council brought two related
5
8
actions to enforce the charitable trust.

On review, the court first noted that the Uniform Act places
the duty to supervise charitable trusts on the attorney general and
that he or she is ordinarily the party to enforce them. Citing language from Holt that "[t]here is no rule or policy against supplementing the Attorney General's power of enforcement by allowing
other responsible individuals to sue on behalf of the charity,"8 6 the
court held that the County Council was a responsible party to
maintain an action, particularly because its articles of incorporation charged it with the duty to represent and protect the scouts
within its district. 87 The court further stated that the scouts' needs
for representation could best be met by "those who are directly
concerned with their interests and welfare." 8
82. Id. at 756, 394 P.2d at 937, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
83.

Id.

84.

14 Cal. App. 3d 189, 92 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1971).

85. Id. at 191-92, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 187. It is unclear whether the plaintiff first asked the
attorney general to bring an action, but this may be reasonably assumed from the fact that
the second suit joined the attorney general as a defendant.
86. Id. at 195, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (quoting Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians
& Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750, 755-56, 394 P.2d 932, 936, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 248 (1964)).

87. 14 Cal. App. 3d at 195, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
88. Id. at 196, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 190. In a footnote the court stated that it was not
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The court's holding in San Diego County Council, which extends standing to sue to a representative of a beneficiary class, is
apparently confined to the facts of the case. No other decision has
cited this opinion, much less used it to extend standing to general
beneficiaries. The decision indicates, however, that if the attorney
general's refusal to bring suit on behalf of a beneficiary is viewed
by a court as incorrect, the beneficiary will be afforded standing to
assert his or her claims.
General beneficiaries also have been allowed to sue for the enforcement of a trust in California under the doctrine of relation. 9
Relator status has been granted formally by the attorney general
on several occasions.9 0 In general, however, relator status is informally granted. The attorney general is considered to consent to relator status, even in the absence of formal, written permission, if
he or she supports the relator's case before the court.9 1 For example, if the plaintiff's standing is challenged and the attorney general makes an appearance asking the 92court to hear the case, the
court must give the plaintiff standing.
The mere availability of relator status is not a panacea, however, as evidenced by the result in Holt where the attorney general
refused to grant relator status to the minority trustees.9 3 A major
shortcoming of the doctrine of relation is that the attorney general's discretion to grant relator status can be influenced by factors
which do not address the merits of the case. The standing issue has
become increasingly important as the Attorney General's Office has
suffered staff reductions while the number of charitable trusts has
greatly increased." The attorney general has the resources to litigate only a small percentage of breaches of charitable trusts; consequently, it is important that other parties be given standing to
influenced by the attorney general's statement-made for the first time in oral argument-that he would file an action to enforce the trust. Id. at 196 n.1, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
89. A relator is a person in interest who is given permission to sue by the attorney
general although the right to sue resides solely in that official. See Brown Y.Memorial Nat'l
Home Foundation, 162 Cal. App. 2d 513, 538, 329 P.2d 118, 133 (1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 943 (1959).
90. Interview with Larry Tapper, Attorney, Government Law Section, Attorney General's Office, Los Angeles (March 14, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Tapper Interview].
91. Brown v. Memorial Nat'l Homes Foundation, 162 Cal. App. 2d 513, 538-39, 329
P.2d 118, 133-34 (1958).
92. Tapper Interview, supra note 90.
93. 61 Cal. 2d at 752, 394 P.2d at 934, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
94. See notes 95-98 & accompanying text infra.
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sue. Nonetheless, because relator status is available, thus expanding the concept of standing, it seems that charitable trusts are
adequately enforced without enlarging standing to sue to all general beneficiaries.

Applying the Uniform Act
The Uniform Act directs the attorney general to establish a
register of charitable trusts that are subject to the Act's disclosure
requirements.95 Pursuant to this directive, the California Registry
of Charitable Trusts (Registry) was created in 1959.6 The Registry's primary purpose is to compile and review the registration
statements and annual reports filed by charitable organizations. It
also makes those documents available for public inspection, ascertains whether charitable assets are being properly administered,
97
and recommends legal action to the attorney general. The Registry's staff has not grown proportionately to its workload. In 1961,
three auditors monitored 3,000 registrants. Today the same number of auditors monitor 29,000 registrants.98
Charitable organizations register under the Uniform Act by
submitting a copy of their articles of incorporation or trust instrument to the Registry.99 The Registry is able to discover charities
that fail to register because it receives from the Franchise Tax
Board a complete list of all charitable organizations that have been
granted tax exempt status. Any organization on the Tax Board's
list which has not registered is contacted by the Registry's

"95. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12584 (West 1963).
96. Howland, The History of the Supervision of Charitable Trusts and Corporations
in California, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (1966).
of Charitable Trusts (October 9, 1980)
97 Interview with Larry Campbell, Registrar
cited as Campbell Interview].
[hereinafter
'98. Id. The charitable organizations registered under the Uniform Act are a subcat-1
TAx. Code §§ 23701a-23701
ego y of nonprofit organizations in California. See CAL. REv. &
There are approximateb
organizations).
nonprofit
noncharitable,
of
(examples
(.West 1979)
new nonprofit organza
500
approximately
73,400 nonprofit organizations in California with
73,400 organizations
these
Of
97.
note
supra
Interview,
Campbell
month.
each
tions created
charitable orga
approximately 50,000 are charitable. Id. Approximately 18,000 of the 50,000
1963). Of th
(West
12585
§
nizations are exempt from registration. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
registratior
awaiting
are
3,000
and
registered
are
remaining 32,000 organizations, 29,000
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300
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month
Each
97.
note
supra
Campbell Interview,
to be registered. Id. The 29,0J
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99. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12585 (West 1963).
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auditors. 100
Registered charitable organizations must file annual financial
reports with the Registry. 01 When the Registry was created in
1959, the auditors reviewed each annual report as it was fied. As
the number of charitable organizations grew this became impossible.10 2 The Registry's first response to the overload was to review
only charities with assets greater than $10,000. As the number of
charities increased further, however, only those with assets greater
than $100,000 could be reviewed. 03s As a result, many smaller charities received no review for many years.'0 "
In response to this situation, the Registry developed a computer system in 1973 to perform an initial screening of the annual
reports. 105 The system was enhanced in 1978 to assign an audit
score to each report processed. The computer analyzes and assigns
a score to each of the entries on the reporting forms, weighing
more heavily those factors that tend to indicate impropriety or
mismanagement. 08 After each annual report has been scored by
100. Campbell Interview, supra note 97.
101. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12586(a) (West Supp. 1980). The biggest problem faced by the
staff is the late filings. As of December, 1979, about 16% of the registered charities were
delinquent in filing annual reports. Campbell Interview, supra note 97. The penalty for late
filing is the disallowance of the charity's tax exemption which results in a $200 minimum
tax for each year of noncompliance. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 23703 (West 1979). Paying
this tax from an organization's charitable funds can subject its trustees to personal liability
for their negligence. This severe penalty ultimately takes money from the beneficiaries and
as a result removal of a charity's tax exemption is used primarily as a threat to prompt
voluntary compliance. Campbell Interview, supra note 97.
Some charities contend that the form is laboriously long and unreasonably expensive to
complete. The form is eight phges long, but five pages consist of special schedules. By contrast, federal report form 990PF is eight pages long and requires preparers to develop and
attach additional schedules. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12586(b) (West Supp. 1980) (attorney
general cannot require disclosure that unreasonably adds to the expense of administering
the trust). No suits have been filed under this section. The Registry has tried to alleviate the
burden of reporting for small trusts by creating a shorter form for their use and requiring
trusts with less than $5,000 in annual revenue to report only once every six years. Campbell
Interview, supra note 97.
102. In, 1961 three auditors monitered 3,000 registrants. By 1968 four auditors
monitered 9,000 registrants, but the review of annual reports was three years behind. Campbell Interview, supra note 97.
103. Id.
104. The increasing number of charities also resulted in the auditors spending a
greater percentage of their time on servicing functions rather than on reviewing reports.
Servicing functions range from answering numerous telephone inquiries from charities concerning the required forms to answering public inquiries about charities.
105. Campbell Interview, supra note 97.
106. Id. For example, the computer notes if there is excess noninterest bearing cash in
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the computer, the auditors begin examining the reports with the
highest scores. With three auditors working, desk audits can be
performed each year on about 5 to 9% of the 29,000 organizations
presently filing reports. 107 In most cases, an initially suspicious en-

try is explained by close inspection of the reporting form or by
telephoning the charity for an explanation. Such explanations are
usually acceptable.""' Where a discrepancy in the report cannot be
adequately explained or where misconduct is uncovered, the auditor will forward the report and the organization's public file to the
attorney general with a recommendation for field investigation or
legal action.109 Currently over 650 Registry file referrals are assigned to the attorney general and the number is increasing each
year. As the backlog increases, the Registry staff takes a more active role in settling more serious matters, such as self-dealing and
excessive director salaries, under the direction of a staff attorney
from the attorney general's office. 10 However, any abuse that has
cost beneficiaries a great deal of money over many years is always
handled by the Attorney General's Office.
Cases come to the attention of the attorney general in four
ways.' The largest percentage of cases arise from complaints by
minority trustees or beneficiaries, usually concerning the mishandling of assets by majority trustees.1 2 The second most common
source is notification by a court. The Uniform Act requires the attorney general to be a party to any proceeding in which there is an
attempt to modify or to terminate a trust instrument. 18 Cy pres
relation to operating expenses, plus 50 other similar checks. The computer finds one or more
questionable items in about 90% of the long forms that are filed; therefore, the weighted
score feature is essential to audit effectiveness. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Of the approximately 2,200 reports reviewed annually by the auditors, about 5060 are referred to attorneys. Id.
110. Id.
111. Interview with Gail Strader, Attorney, Government Law Section, Attorney General's Office, Sacramento (March 19, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Strader Interview].
112. Id.
113. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12591 (West 1963). The Uniform Act also requires that anyone who offers a will for probate which establishes a charitable trust must send a copy of the
instrument to the attorney general. Id. § 12593. These sections broaden and subsume other
notification provisions in the probate code. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 328 (West Supp. 1980)
(attorney general must be notified in any petiton for probate where a charitable bequest
does not name a trustee or beneficiary); id. § 1080 (attorney general must be notified of any
action to determine heirship where estate involves a charitable trust which does not name a
trustee or beneficiary); id. § 1120 (attorney general must be notified of any petition to
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cases and other will contests also are typically referred to the attorney general by the courts. A third source of cases is the Registry.114 The final source of cases is the charitable organization itself.
When trustees contemplate a questionable transaction that will apthey often request
pear in the trust's annual report to the Registry,
11 5
the attorney general's approval in advance.
The majority of the caseload handled by the Attorney General's Office falls into two areas-mishandling of assets by trustees
and will contests.116 Mishandling of assets by trustees can occur in
numerous ways. Upon discovering mismanagement of a trust's business affairs, the attorney general often will bring an action against
its trustees for restitution. For example, in Lynch v. John M. Red1 7 the attorney general brought suit against the
field Foundation"
foundation's directors, alleging mismanagement for accumulating
$50,000 in a checking account over a period of five years.11 The
court found that the trustees breached the prudent person investment rule and held them liable for the interest lost as a result of
their negligence.11 9
The attorney general rarely seeks to remove trustees from office.120 Courts require a strong likelihood of future misconduct by
the trustees, and often trustees against whom actions are brought
will resign their office. In a case involving the University of San
Fernando, however, the attorney general did successfully remove
amend a trust to qualify for estate tax deductions).
114. The number of cases referred to attorneys by the Registry is small because the
Registry is able to solve many matters itself. See notes 107-10 & accompanying text supra.
In addition, only a limited amount of misconduct is discoverable in annual reports. The
Registry, however, is a vital source of background information when the attorney general
receives a case from a different source. Strader Interview, supra note 111.
115. Tapper Interview, supra note 90.
116. Strader Interview, supra note 111. The confidentiality of attorney work product
makes it impossible to obtain information on cases currently being investigated. Also, public
files do not give information on the many settled cases or the vast number of unreported
court opinions. Consequently, the case analysis which follows is largely restricted to the
limited number of reported cases.
117. 9 Cal. App. 3d 293, 88 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1970).
118. The case does not indicate whether the mismanagement was discovered by the
Registry, but this is the type of activity which is revealed in the annual reports to the
Registry.
119. 9 Cal. App. 3d at 301, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 91. See also In re Trustees of Turner, Civ.
Nos. 665343, 665344 (San Francisco Super. Ct. July 23, 1974). The court in Turner held a
bank and an attorney liable for penalty taxes assessed against the trust because of the
trust's award of a scholarship to a distant relative of the trustor.
120. Tapper Interview, supra note 90.
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trustees who had been involved in misconduct. In that case, the
trustees leased a building to the university in 1965. In 1974 the
trustees simultaneously borrowed $500,000 from the university and
renegotiated the lease to provide for additional payments to them.
The attorney general alleged that the transaction constituted selfdealing. A settlement subsequently was reached with the trustees
whereby they transferred the facilities to the university for
$300,000 and cancellation of their $500,000 debt, resigned their
positions, and relinquished all rights under their employment con121
tracts with the university.

Mismanagement can also occur during dissolution of the charitable trust and the resulting distribution of its assets to other charities. In such cases there is a potential for self-dealing and undue
influence by the trustees. To ensure that assets are distributed in
the public interest, the attorney general is a necessary party to all
dissolution proceedings.122 The leading California case in this area
is In re Veterans' Industries,Inc.,125 in which a charitable corporation dissolved and nominated a distributee to receive its assets.
The superior court held that if the dissolving corporation nominates a donee having a similar purpose, the attorney general cannot recommend another. The court also concluded that it lacked
power to make any substitution.1

2

The court of appeal disagreed,

stating that the dissolving corporation's nomination of a distributee is not binding on the court; such a nomination should not prevent the attorney general from exercising his or her discretion in
determining the existence of other potential beneficiaries. 25 The
court also held that the distribution should carry out the original
trust purposes as nearly as possible. The attorney general was perceived to be ably suited to identify potential distributees to the
court because of the information provided him or her under the
126
Uniform Act.

The reasoning in Veteran's Industries was applied to a church
dissolution in Metropolitan Church, Inc. v. Younger.1 27 The six
121.
122.
1980).
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Charitable Trusts and Solicitations Newsletter, Sept. 1977, at 6-7.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12591 (West 1963); CAL. CORP. CODE § 6510(d) (West Supp.
8 Cal. App. 3d 902, 88 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1970).
Id. at 914-15, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
Id. at 919-20, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
Id. at 919, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
48 Cal. App. 3d 850, 121 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1975).
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church members voted to dissolve the church and to distribute
one-third of its assets to a Bethel Baptist Church in Iowa and the
remainder to two local fundamentalist Baptist Churches and other
organizations. The court held that the church's articles of incorporation evidenced a purpose to conduct a fundamentalist Baptist
Church in Richmond, California and that this purpose was best
dividing the assets equally between the two local
fulfilled by
28
1

churches.

A third situation in which mismanagement can arise involves
the sale of assets by a charitable trust. Typically, the attorney general challenges the fairness of the sale, claiming the assets were
sold for less than fair market value, although occasionally the sale
is alleged to defeat the purpose of the trust. Sales below fair market value often occur when foundations1 29 that own controlling interests in closely-held corporations sell stock back to the corporation at a depressed price or enter into other transactions at the
expense of the foundation. The conflicts of interests inherent in
this situation require the attorney general to represent the foundation's interests.
Although not strictly a divestiture case, Queen of Angels Hospital v. Younger 5 0 presents an analogous situation. The hospital
had operated as a charitable institution since 1927. In 1971,
Queen's Board of Directors leased the hospital to a private corporation for a rental of $1,000,000 per year. Queen intended to use
the money to establish and operate free medical clinics in Los
Angeles. The attorney general contended that, under its articles of
incorporation, Queen held its assets primarily for the purpose of
operating a hospital and that the use of those assets to operate
clinics would constitute an abandonment of Queen's primary purpose. The court agreed and, citing Holt, stated that the issue was
not the desirability of the clinics, but whether they were authorized by the articles of incorporation.""
128. Id. at 860, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
129. The term "foundation" generally refers to any charitable corporation. A nonprofit
corporation is deemed to be a foundation by the IRS and hence exempt from federal income
tax if it (1) distributes its income each year; (2) does not engage in certain types of selfdealing, (3) does not retain excess business holdings; and (4) does not make any taxable
expenditures or investments. I.R.C. § 508(e)(1). See also CAL. CorP. CODE § 5260 (Deering
1979) (accompanying comments).
130. 66 Cal. App. 3d 359, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1977).
131. ' Id. at 368-69, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 4041. In two unreported divestiture cases, the
attorney general recovered large sums for the charities involved. Tapper Interview, supra
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Finally, mismanagement resulting from a conflict of interest
can arise when lawyers and executors who are trustees charge excessive fees for work done for the charitable trust or the estate. In
this situation the trust is not likely to protest. The attorney general has become increasingly active in contesting such excessive
fees.

13 2

The issue of excessive fees was raised in Estate of Getty,13 3 an
action to determine the validity of a codicil to J. Paul Getty's will.
The court in Getty viewed the fees paid to the executors and attorneys excessive, particularly in light of the fact that the estate essentially consisted of one easily distributed, liquid asset: shares of
1 4
Getty Oil stock.
Getty's will made specific bequests to a number of individuals
and left the residue of the estate to the Getty Museum, a charitable trust. Because payment of the full amounts claimed for attorneys' and executors' fees would significantly reduce the museum's
note 90. In Smith v. James Irving Foundation, Civ. No. 22136 (Orange County Super. Ct.
1974), Mobil Corporation offered to purchase the foundation's shares of the Irvine Corporation for approximately $110,000,000 in preferred stock. The attorney general filed a crosscomplaint against the foundation alleging that the sale price was too low and that the timing was improper and obtained an injunction barring the sale. The court eventually approved the sale of the foundation's shares to a consortium for $185,000,000 cash. Tapper
Interview, supra note 90.
Younger v. The Ahmanson Foundation, Civ. No. C102814 (Los Angeles Super. Ct.
1974), involved a more direct conflict of interest. As the result Of a bequest, the Ahmanson
Foundation held title to a large block of shares in H. F. Ahmanson & Co., the parent company to Home Savings and Loan, but Dorothy Ahmanson Sullivan retained the right to vote
the shares and receive dividends from them. The foundation, which was controlled by Ms.
Sullivan and her sons, agreed to grant her a fee simple interest in part of the shares in
return for her granting the foundation a fee simple interest in the balance of the stock. An
agreement which would have given Ms. Sullivan 86% of the shares and the foundation 14%
of the shares was approved by the IRS, indicating that the IRS did not consider the transaction to be unfair to the foundation or to constitute the type of self-dealing which would
cause the foundation to lose its federal tax exemption. The attorney general sued to enjoin
the transaction on the grounds that it was unfair to the foundation in that the division of
the stock favored Ms. Sullivan. A settlement was subsequently reached giving Ms. Sullivan
15% of the shares and the foundation 85%. The additional shares which the foundation
received as a result of the attorney general's efforts were valued at $45,000,000. Tapper
Interview, supra note 90.
132. Interview with Lauren Brainard, Government Law Section, Attorney General's
Office, Los Angeles (March 18, 1980). There are apparently no reported cases of the attorney
general contesting excessive fees in the charitable trust context.
133. 85 Cal. App. 3d 755, 149 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1978).
134. Id. at 760 n.4, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 660. Seven months after Getty's death $3,000,000
was paid to executors as a partial allowance on a statutory commission of over $7,000,000
and $2,000,000 was paid as a partial allowance of statutory attorney's fees of over
$7,000,000.
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bequest and because the composition of the museum's board of directors, which included executors of the estate and affiliates of the
attorneys for the estate, made it doubtful that the board would
impartially consider the question, the court invited
the attorney
13 5
general take appropriate action in the matter.
The attorney general also represents the public interest in will
contests. When a bequest to a large institution is contested, the
institution's interests are adequately represented by its attorneys."' s Many cases, however, involve small charities that cannot
afford counsel. Often the will names no specific beneficiary who
may assert his or her rights. In these situations, the attorney general will intervene in the public interest.
The attorney general's power to intervene in will contests after
the Uniform Act was confirmed in Estate of Ventura.13 7 In Ventura, the trial court had upheld a charitable bequest to an orphan's
home, denying a motion to exclude the attorney general from the
proceedings. 3 " On review, the court of appeal affirmed the right of
the attorney general to intervene in the proceedings, holding: "It
is well established that it is not only the right but the duty of the
Attorney General to participate in court proceedings to protect
charitable gifts.'

3 9

The court was not persuaded by the argument

that section 12591 of the Uniform Act limits the attorney general's
power to enforce the disclosure requirements or to prevent misuse
of charitable funds; the statute gives power to the attorney general
"in addition to his existing powers and duties. ' "' 0
Charitable bequests are often contested by heirs as being indefinite, impossible to distribute, or illegal. In these cases the
attorney general may ask the court to invoke the cy pres doctrine
135. Id. The attorney general has not yet taken any action because the doctrine of
ripeness bars any suit until the remainder of the fees are paid. Interview with Lauren Bralnard, Government Law Section, Attorney General's Office, Los Angeles (March 15, 1980).
136. Interview with Richard Martland, Assistant Attorney General, Government Law
Section, Sacramento (March 19, 1980).
137. 217 Cal. App. 2d 50, 31 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1963).
138. The testator's half-brother appealed from a judgment entered upon a motion for
a directed verdict. The appellant alleged that the executor had exercised undue influence by
persuading the decedent to leave the residue of his estate to charity and not to his halfbrother. The court of appeal upheld the lower court's view that the decedent's bequest to an
orphan's home rather than to his half-brother did not indicate undue influence. The court
noted that the executor received no bequest under the will, which tended to refute the
charge of undue influence. Id. at 58-60, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 494-95.
139. Id. at 57, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
140. Id. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12591 (West 1963).
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to effect the general charitable intent of the testator rather than to
execute the will as written and allow the property to pass to other
heirs.14 1 For example, in Estate of Gatlin,1 42 the court applied the
cy pres doctrine to uphold the decedent's bequest to homes for the
blind and crippled children in his holographic will even though no
specific charitable institutions were named. 43 In another instance,
the testatrix left twenty percent of her estate to "the Lord" in her
holographic will. Her heirs attacked the bequest as too vague because it did not name a specific beneficiary. The attorney general
intervened and persuaded the court to leave the money to the de144
cedent's Baptist Church.
The doctrine of cy pres was employed in Estate of Lamb" 5 to
solve a different problem. Ms. Lamb left the remainder of her
estate to the San Francisco Foundation of Otology, a charitable
corporation which was not formed until four months after her
death.1 46 The specific bequest, however, was impossible to execute
because title to property passing by a will vests in the legatee at
the moment of death. The heirs therefore sought distribution of
the remainder to themselves. The attorney general intervened
seeking to validate the bequest. On appeal, the court held that the
bequest was effective because it met a two-part test: the gift was a
charitable one intended to benefit an indefinite class of individuals, and the testatrix's dominant intent was to carry out a charitable purpose and not to give a gift to a particular institution.147 The
court based its finding upon extrinsic evidence of Ms. Lamb's
intent. 148
A similar problem was before the court in Estate of Connolly.1 49 Mr. Connolly left his entire estate to a nonprofit California corporation that he had helped to form. The bequest was impossible to effect because the organization dissolved at the
141. The cy pres doctrine allows a court to administer the trust in conformity with the
testator's wishes if it finds a general charitable intent beyond his or her specific bequest. 4
ScoTr, supra note 1, § 399, at 3084-85.
142. 16 Cal. App. 3d 644, 94 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1971).
143. Id. at 649-50, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
144. Strader Interview, supra note 111.
145. 19 Cal. App. 3d 859, 97 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1971).
146. Id. at 864-65, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
147. Id. at 866, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
148. Ms. Lamb herself suffered from otosclerosis and had manifested a desire to provide relief to others suffering from the same disease. Id. at 863, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 47-48.
149. 48 Cal. App. 3d 129, 121 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1975).
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testator's death. The attorney general argued that the legacy constituted a charitable trust and, upon demise of the original trustee,
the lower court should properly appoint a successor trustee pursuant to the cy pres doctrine. The court of appeal agreed, and the
bequest went to another charitable trustee rather than to the decedent's nieces. 1 0
A will contested on the grounds that a charitable bequest contained therein is illegal usually contains a religious or racial restriction. Rather than allowing the bequest to be invalidated, however,
the attorney general will often urge the use of cy pres to apply the
bequest to a legal charitable purpose. For example, in Estate of
Vanderhoofven,'511 the testator left his estate "to some Protestant
school that is all white of Engineering training, I care not
which.1 152 The trial court had refused to apply the cy pres doctrine
because it believed that the decedent's dominant intent was to discriminate and not to provide for the education of engineering students. The court of appeal remanded the case for an examination
the donor's intent which had been exof the extrinsic evidence of
53
court.1
trial
the
by
cluded

Conclusion
The involvement of the attorney general in the mismanagement cases and will contests discussed above has resulted in substantial financial benefits to general, public beneficiaries. To the
extent that the Registry has alerted the Attorney General's Office
to such cases, it has greatly improved the supervision of charitable
trusts.
The daily operation of the Registry and the Attorney General's Office indicates that the Uniform Act has greatly improved
the supervision of charitable trusts. Although the Registry is not a
major source of litigation for the Attorney General's Office, it
serves several important functions. By scrutinizing annual reports
and discovering problems at their incipiency, the Registry prevents
a great deal of mismanagement. It serves to remind trustees of the
existence of review. It also encourages trustees to seek approval
150.
151.

Id. at 133, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
18 Cal. App. 3d 940, 96 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1971). See also In re Estate of Zahn, 16

Cal. App. 3d 106, 93 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1971).
152.
153.

18 Cal. App. 3d at 943, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
Id. at 948, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
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from the attorney general before entering into certain transactions
that appear on disclosure forms. In the absence of the Registry's
preventative function, the Attorney General's Office would be
forced to handle cases involving more serious misconduct.
Unfortunately, state budget cutbacks may threaten the Registry program.1 In addition, staff reductions and hiring freezes have
affected the attorneys who handle matters involving charitable
trusts. The charitable trust section of the Attorney General's Office
represents the public interest, and, unlike other departments in
the Attorney General's Office, no client agencies or organized interest groups lobby on its behalf. In addition, the large amount of
money recovered through the attorney general's efforts is not publicized to avoid creating the impression that fraud and mismanagement of charitable trusts are common. 155 It is believed that this
would reduce the public confidence in charities and contributions
would suffer.
Present staff limitations keep the Attorney General's Office
from prosecuting all the complaints it receives.1 56 As the disparity
between the number of potential cases and available attorney time
increases, two factors become critical. First, the attorney general
must continue to grant relator status liberally, thus enabling private parties to bring actions to enforce charitable trusts. Second,
the attorney general should develop a discretionary policy to determine which cases to prosecute and on which of those cases to expend the most resources.
The attorney general currently has no comprehensive policy
for allocating resources among charitable trust cases; individual attorneys have a great deal of discretion. The majority of attorney
time thus is spent on cases involving large dollar amounts, while
the remainder is divided among other cases depending on the egregiousness of the conduct. Although the amount of the potential recovery is a good initial indicator of how much attorney time should
154. Campbell Interview, supra note 97. Budget cutbacks following Proposition 13,
adopted as article 13, § a of the California Constitution, resulted in a reduction of the Registry auditors from four to three. The possibility of future budget cutbacks has already had
an adverse effect on the Registry. One auditor recently changed to a different government
job which she felt was more secure, leaving the Registry with only two auditors. Id. Her
position is nearly impossible to fill because of a hiring freeze.
155. Campbell Interview, supra note 97.
156. Interview with Richard Martland, Assistant Attorney General, Government Lavy
Section, Sacramento (March 19, 1980).
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be spent on a case, allocating attorney time in this way will not
always maximize the benefit to the public. Particularly as the attorney general's caseload increases, additional criteria should be
developed. Three factors might be considered. First, the attorney
general might consider the financial need of a charity prior to instituting a suit to recover funds for it. Some charities receive more
income than they can spend effectively,15 7 and even if a charity
does not have excess funds, there may be numerous other charities
that seek to accomplish the same purpose. In both situations, successful action by the attorney general to recover funds might have
little impact on the ultimate beneficiaries.
A second factor to be considered is the size of the class of the
charity's beneficiaries. Some charities benefit only a very limited
number of people, while others have numerous beneficiaries. A
third factor is the importance of the charity to its beneficiaries.
For example, the attorney general might be able to recover equal
amounts of money for two charities, one whose purpose is to provide emergency medical services and one whose purpose is to provide free concerts. If all other considerations are equal, the attorney general might devote more resources to a breach of the first
trust than to a breach of the second. Admittedly these factors are
subjective and difficult to apply, but they do identify instances
where selecting cases solely to maximize monetary recovery may
not maximize the benefit to the public.

157. In 1972 it was revealed that Boys' Town had an annual income in excess of
$25,000,000 and operating expenses of only $8,100,000. Nevertheless, administrators continued to solicit donations. NEwswEE, Oct. 25, 1976 at 18.

